

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR  
VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE


CYPRUS

- I. (Map, Cyprus) On Cyprus, the picture has changed radically since early June, when a Turkish invasion was narrowly averted.
  - A. The Greeks, who appeared to have been caught off guard in June, have been moving men and weapons into Cyprus for the past six weeks, disembarking at night and under maximum security at the port of Limassol.
  - B. There may now be 7,000 to 8,000 regular Greek troops on the island, many of them documented as Greek Cypriots. We think there are at least three infantry regiments, in addition to artillery units and special raiding forces, lying low in the Troodos Mountains of central Cyprus.
    1. The Greek government has admitted only that a hundred or so officers have "deserted" to join General Grivas. UN officials on Cyprus agree that some Greek regular units have reached the island, but think there are probably no more than 1,200, to 1,500.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

25X1




25X1

3. Nearly 1,000 truck-loads of material have also been landed at Limassol.

C. Greek Cypriot irregular forces, dispersed all over the island, may number as high as 30 to 35 thousand.

1. These forces have become both cocky and hostile in their relations with the UN forces as well as with the Turks.

II. The Turkish Cypriot irregulars probably do not number more than 13,000, and they lack transport, arms, and equipment.

A.  the Turks have also been smuggling men and weapons into Cyprus, but the volume is insignificant compared to what has been reaching the Greek Cypriots.

1. There are probably no more than 1,000 Turks over and above the 650-man regiment authorized by treaty.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

III. These figures show that Turkish intervention now would be a much more difficult proposition than it would have been in June.

A. Immediately after the June crisis, the Turkish military concentration in Southern Turkey was dispersed, but Ankara may be pulling it together again.

1. A number of destroyers which were being overhauled have been rushed back into service ahead of schedule, and the Turkish military authorities have been restricting our observation of some of the key south coast ports and airfields.
2. Current large-scale maneuvers in the Mersin-Iskenderun area will increase Turkey's amphibious readiness and could be the first stage of a new serious threat of armed intervention in Cyprus.

B. Present Turkish planning for intervention in Cyprus probably calls for Turkish air force attacks on Greek Cypriot military targets to help the Turkish Cypriots hold out until help can be moved in from Turkey.

IV. The great increase in Greek and Greek Cypriot strength naturally has increased the confidence of the Makarios regime.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



25X1

- A. Makarios himself is making statements to the effect that there can be no question of compromise or concession, since Cyprus is now "an impregnable fortress."
- B. The Greek Government in Athens, aware that any rash move by Makarios and the Greek Cypriot irregulars could easily touch off war between Greece and Turkey, is trying to ensure that all forces responsive to Greek influence take their orders from Grivas, not Makarios, counting on the former underground hero as a restraining factor.
- C. Grivas has, as a matter of fact, tightened central control and discipline among the various groups of armed Greek Cypriots, which were operating almost independently of any control before he slipped back into Cyprus on June 12.
- V. Dean Acheson has been conducting separate talks in Geneva with representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

- A. These talks are an outgrowth of the conversations President Johnson had with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu and subsequently Greek Prime Minister Papandreou in Washington late in June.
- B. Mr. Acheson's efforts, approved by UN Secretary General Thant, are being closely coordinated with the UN mediator in Geneva.
- C. The Greek Cypriot Government is not represented at Geneva and Makarios has already denounced the talks publicly.
  1. The talks are being held, however, on the theory that Greece would be able to sell any agreed solution to the Greek Cypriots either with or without Makarios' approval.
  2. Recent reporting from the US Ambassador in Nicosia and from Athens casts some doubt that the Greek Government can exercise this degree of control over Makarios.
  3. Makarios has, against Athens' wishes, ordered four torpedo boats from the Soviets.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

- VI. During the talks thus far, Mr. Acheson has offered suggestions aimed at narrowing the field of controversy and at eventually bringing the two principals into direct negotiations.
- A. Mr. Acheson is offering no "American Plan" as such but rather a series of exploratory proposals.
1. His suggestions include the creation of a Turkish base area on Cyprus; a large degree of local self-government for the Turkish minority, and an international presence on the island to assure the protection of minority rights.
  2. The proposed Turkish base would be located on Karpas Peninsula on the eastern panhandle of the island. Such a base area could serve both Turkey's national security needs and in an emergency offer a safe-haven for the Turkish Cypriot minority.
- B. Mr. Acheson also has suggested that a UN commission be set up on the island to assure the Turkish Cypriot minority that their rights would be guaranteed.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

VII. Greeks and Turks have shown a willingness to negotiate on most all issues, but still seem far apart.

A. The Turks, while insisting on something resembling full partition, have shown considerable flexibility on boundary lines.

1. They insist, however, that Turkey's right of sovereignty over a part of Cyprus must be recognized and that the area must be large enough to fill both Turkey's security and prestige needs.
2. As a military necessity, they demand that any base area include the entire Karpas Peninsula and a substantial strip of land along the northeast sector of the island.
3. The Turks showed some preliminary interest in the Greek offer of the small Greek island of Kastellorizon just off Turkey's southern coast, but only as part of a broader formula.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

4. The Turkish military representative at the talks, who reflects the views of the Turkish General Staff, insists that Turkey must have at least one port--preferably Kyrenia--plus shared rights at Famagusta.
  5. The various lines on the map represent Turkish positions put forth from time to time during the talks. The more inclusive of these are unrealistic and the Turks know it.
- B. Greece has flatly rejected the concept of Turkish sovereignty over any part of Cyprus, regardless how small. It has offered the counter-proposal of a base area under lease.
1. The Greeks also suggested at one point that the British base areas while remaining under British control could perhaps be shared by the Turks. This suggestion the Turks turned down.
  2. While the Greek representative is listening to the Acheson proposals and carrying them back to Athens for study, he apparently has no authority to negotiate.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

25X1

The most that he can contribute to the discussions, therefore, is to offer the Greek reaction to suggestions made, rather than offer any of his own.

3. Although Papandreou has indicated a serious desire to find an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem, he shows no sign of giving in to the Turkish territorial demands. He also realizes, of course, that he must get a deal that he can sell to the Greek Cypriots.

VIII. The Geneva discussions have now passed the exploratory stage and all participants know that the crucial period has arrived. Unless the Greeks show some willingness to accept the basic concept of a Turkish sovereign presence on the island, the Geneva effort may break down.

- A. Mr. Acheson himself has termed the sovereignty issue as a very high hurdle indeed.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/07/12 : CIA-RDP00025R000400160010-4

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP00025R000400160010-4

**TOP SECRET**